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CURRENT ACTIVITIES
Targeted attack on FireEye
Original Issue Date:December 14, 2020
It has been reported that Fireeye Inc! has reportedly been targeted by a cyber-attack which has resulted in the theft of their red-team / penetration testing tools.The attack campaign is reportedly attributed to a highly sophisticated actor employing novel techniques to gain access.Details of tools stolen in this cyber breach are provided below:-
AdPassHunt:- credential stealer tool that hunts Active Directory credentials.- 590bd7609edf9ea8dab0b5fbc38393a870b329de
- 29385446751ddbca27c26c43015be7ab0d548b895531fba9b03d612e53bd9ff0
Beacon:- used for several goals, such as persistence, execution, privilege escalation, credential dumping, lateral movement etc.- 03a8efce7fcd5b459adf3426166b8bda56f8d8439c070b620bccb85a283295f4
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- 61cd1311d2e4663b86b5a70c2aafd5af6b247a6ebf407170296e37aaf8c69392
Beltalowda:- used for conducting variety of security-oriented checks on victim machine.- d80b7a31d68b5f483073ff7af0984c1090f6a493f84db7d3a301e3e35fdb4a56
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- bb939544ac109ca674ee9de4d8b292f9b117c9c676ddab61d15a6e219ad3986c
Rubeus, Fluffy:- used to Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets.- 8bebf19d54c749560301eaada2e92eb240501b8c
- a729d51f3deff5065e4978df2f88517d26e0d5db542c9cf8501a4206d8d2432c
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- 76faeb790d1c1aa5fd3473f86f602b371682415368ddd553ebc60eb3c7683f7f
- 0097d59dc02cbac14df25ef05fc6d75f835d1db68f760d71fa4a0a57d9960606
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- 65044ea9fea1e34042adf3ff5e5fb17fc021ba4b0775415fad2465558a782c5e
G2JS:- used for automating Microsoft Windows Script Host (WSH) scripts weaponization.- dcce258cc818febe2b888c8eee42aa95393b2fb4f1f2406330840ab8ad5c7d50
- A3a8dedf82741a1997b17a44fbb1e5712ba3a5db11146519cf39281def9329a7
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- 117b9c9127beaf2e3ce7837c5e313084fd3926f1ebf1a77563149e08347cb029
InveighZero:- used for man in middle attack like LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay.- 78fafeb22bf31de02a4b56114e86dcc3394e382658a5c95b1a302d3d8794718d
- 2728c46f4fcf62f3faee72be30f1dd75528391b0d70da302544f5282d58c931b
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- 0c080548e15e7f377baed2a550d48a555e6150d969f7f4b8244c3b3a50afb858
KeeFarce:- used for extracting password from memory.- 5ea9a04284157081bd5999e8be96dda8fac594ba72955adacb6fa48bdf866434
PuppyHound:- used as data collector.- 23490f7ac40b6b15c228ed8f8e9122d460469aa4025ed7008660e4310ef7e70f
- a7240d8a7aee872c08b915a58976a1ddee2ff5a8a679f78ec1c7cf528f40deed
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SafetyKatz:- used for credential dumping.- 2b3cab071ca6f104377a7684eb586150fdec11df2dc8cebcb468f57a82f10c73
- 89a456943cf6d2b3cd9cdc44f13a23640575435ed49fa754f7ed358c1a3b6ba9
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- 27dd261ad7f3ad7d782625c2a459caf6ae81109ffe8f830b68b154f02d578658
Dtrim:- used as credential dumping, Process injection.
SharpZeroLogon:- used the exploit for the Zero logon vulnerability (CVE-2020-1472)
NoAmci:- used to bypass AMSI (Windows Antimalware Scan Interface) detection.
NetAssemblyInject:- used to inject C# .NET assemblies into arbitrary Windows process.
ImpacketObf:- used for working with network protocols.
In addition to the red-team tools, the leaked list contains payload exploits leveraging the listed below vulnerabilities:-
CVE-2014-1812:- Privilege escalation in Microsoft Windows Vista SP2, Windows Server 2008 SP2 and R2 SP1, Windows 7 SP1, Windows 8, Windows
8.1, and Windows Server 2012
CVE-2016-0167:- Privilege escalation in Microsoft Windows CVE-2017-11774: Remote Code Execution in Microsoft Outlook CVE-2018-13379:- Pre-authorization Arbitrary File Read in Fortigate SSL VPN
CVE-2018-15961:- Remote Code Execution in Adobe ColdFusion
CVE-2019-0604:- Remote Code Execution in Microsoft Share point CVE-2019-0708:- Remote Code Execution in Windows Remote Desktop Services (RDS)
CVE-2019-11580:- Remote Code Execution in Atlassian Crowd CVE-2019-19781:- Remote Code Execution in Citrix Application Delivery Controller and Citrix Gateway
CVE-2019-3398:- Authenticated Remote Code Execution in Confluence CVE-2019-8394:- Pre-authorization Arbitrary File Upload in ZoHo Manage Engine Service Desk Plus
CVE-2020-0688:- Remote Code Execution in Microsoft Exchange CVE-2020-1472:- Privilege Escalation in Microsoft Active Directory
CVE-2018-8581:- Privilege Escalation in Microsoft Exchange Server CVE-2020-10189:- Remote Code Execution in ZoHo Manage Engine Desktop Central
Recommendations and Countermeasures- Assess systems against aforementioned vulnerabilities [using vulnerability scanning and monitoring tools] and apply appropriate patches / upgrade to recent stable versions.
- FireEye also released a repository of signatures/rules designed to detect the use of these tools across a variety of detection technologies- including snort YARA, Open IOCs, ClamAV which could be used for assessing the compromise system[s].
https://github.com/fireeye/red_team_tool_countermeasures
Best practices - Practice good cyber hygiene; backup, update, whitelist applications, limit privilege, and use multifactor authentication. Routinely audit configuration and patch management programs
- Deploy endpoint security tools on all endpoints; ensure they work and are up to date. Systems and installed applications being fully patched and updated
- Deploy web and email filters on the network. Configure these devices to scan for known bad domains, sources, and addresses; block these before receiving and downloading messages. Scan all emails, attachments, and downloads both on the host and at the mail gateway with a reputable antivirus solution
- Scan for and remove suspicious e-mail attachments; ensure the scanned attachment is its "true file type" (i.e., the extension matches the file header). Block attachments of file types:
[exe|pif|tmp|url|vb|vbe|scr|reg|cer|pst|cmd|com|bat|dll|dat|hlp|hta|js|wsf].
Exercise caution when using removable media (e.g., USB thumb drives, external drives, CDs, etc.). Ensure to Scan all software downloaded from the Internet prior to executing.
- Monitor network traffic for unexpected and unapproved protocols, especially outbound to the internet (e.g., SSH, SMB, RDP).
- Restrict execution of PowerShell /WSCRIPT in enterprise environment Ensure installation and use of latest version of PowerShell, with enhanced logging enabled. Script block logging, and transcription enabled. Send the associated logs to a centralized log repository for monitoring and analysis
- Enable Exploit Protection [Successor to EMET] that includes several client side mitigation steps. Detailed configuration steps can be seen in https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/microsoft-defender-atp/enable-exploit-protection. Turn on attack surface reduction rules, including rules that block credential theft, ransomware activity, and suspicious use of PsExec and WMI.
- To address malicious activity initiated through weaponized Office documents, use rules that block advanced macro activity, executable content, process creation, and process injection initiated by Office applications. [To assess the impact of these rules, deploy them in audit mode.]Turn on AMSI for Office VBA on Office 36
- Utilize the Windows Defender Firewall and your network firewall to prevent RPC and SMB communication among endpoints whenever possible. This limits lateral movement as well as other attack activities.
References
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The information provided herein is on "as is" basis, without warranty of any kind. |
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Contact Information
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Email:info@cert-in.org.in
Phone: +91-11-22902657
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Postal Address
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| Indian Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT-In) Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology Government of India Electronics Niketan 6, CGO Complex, Lodhi Road, New Delhi - 110 003 India
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